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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office in Conroe, Texas used 
federal grant funds to purchase a ShadowHawk unmanned helicopter drone.1 The 
Sheriff’s Office was excited to be “on the ground floor” of utilizing drone 
technology for police operations.2 This particular drone could hold a camera 
system along with “a variety of ‘less lethal’ munitions.”3 The Sheriff’s Office 
believed “drones armed with an array of non-lethal force options . . . could save 
lives.”4 While the Sheriff’s Office had no immediate plans to use non-lethal 
weapons on their ShadowHawk drone, Chief Deputy Sheriff Randy McDaniel 
stated that using armed drones was “certainly something that we could look at.”5 
In response to the growing interest in drone use, Congress passed the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA Act), effectively giving a green 
light to federal and domestic law enforcement agencies around the United States 
to begin using unmanned aircraft systems or drones in their daily operations.6 The 
majority of legal debate over domestic drone use focuses on the Fourth 
Amendment search standards and privacy issues involved with allowing a law 
enforcement agency (LEA) to use an unarmed drone equipped with a camera or 
other surveillance equipment, on United States citizens.7 Commentators have not 
 
1. Stephen Dean, New Police Drone Near Houston Could Carry Weapons, CLICK2HOUSTON (Nov. 10, 
2011, 1:51 PM), http://www.click2houston.com/news/New-Police-Drone-Near-Houston-Could-Carry-Weapons 
/-/1735978/4717922/-/59xnnez/-/index.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
2. Id.  
3. Buck Sexton, Aerial ‘Shadowhawk’ Police Drones Can Now Deploy Tasers & Tear Gas, THE BLAZE 
(Mar. 12, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2012/03/12/want-to-see-the-aerial-drone-police-
could-soon-deploy-in-your-town/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
4. Id. (noting that “these are technologies ‘law enforcement utilizes day in and day out’ already”).  
5. Id. 
6. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–95, §§ 334–36, 126 Stat. 11, 72–77. 
(“Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall enter into 
agreements with appropriate government agencies to simplify the process for issuing certificates 
of waiver or authorization with respect to applications seeking authorization to operate public 
unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace system.”). 
7. See, e.g., Timothy T. Takahashi, Drones and Privacy, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 72, 77 (2012) 
(addressing various issues surrounding law enforcement’s use of a drone for surveillance purposes); JAY 
STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT 15–16 (Dec. 2011), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ 
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discussed how the use of an armed drone by a law enforcement officer will affect 
use of force (UOF) standards under the Fourth Amendment or whether the 
standards need to change. This is an important debate for two reasons. First, 
LEAs will inevitably use armed drones8 due to the reduced costs and increased 
officer safety associated with operating a drone.9 Second, as LEA’s interest in 
armed drones grows,10 concern among civil rights groups about the domestic use 
of armed drones increases.11 This Comment argues that allowing domestic LEAs 
to operate armed drones in order to protect the public is constitutional, but will 
likely require agencies to create a separate armed drone UOF policy to address 
material differences in how an officer uses armed force with a drone and to 
provide guidance for officers in the field. 
Part II of this Comment examines the evolution of drone technology from its 
use in the military to current and potential uses in the United States, with a focus 
on LEAs. Part III considers the legal basis for a LEA’s ability to use and operate 
drones in national airspace. Additionally, this section discusses pertinent parts of 
the FAA Act dealing with public agency drone use, current drone rules 
implemented as a result of the FAA Act, and federal and state responses to the 
FAA Act. Part IV addresses public policy issues concerning the use of armed 
drones in the United States. Part V discusses the Fourth Amendment and the 
 
protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf [hereinafter PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE] 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing recommendations on ensuring privacy from surveillance 
drones); Surveillance Drones, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-drones 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating concerns over privacy law and 
drone technology). 
8. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 1 (quoting the chief executive officer of drone manufacturer Vanguard 
Defense Industries who said their drones “are designed to carry weapons for local law enforcement.”).  
9.  See Stephanie Chuang, Bay Area Law Enforcement Agencies Test Drones, NBCBAYAREA.COM (Feb. 
14, 2013, 2:53 PM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Bay-Area-Law-Enforcement-Agencies-Test-
Drones-173415551.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating LEAs are considering drones as a 
“cost-cutting way to replace helicopters, and use technology to fight crime and save lives”). Drones could be 
used in place of helicopters as security for national high-risk targets. See Black Hawk Helicopters, Armed 
Agents Prepared for Super Bowl, CBSNewYORK (Jan. 30, 2014, 5:41 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/ 
2014/01/30/black-hawk-helicopters-armed-agents-prepared-for-super-bowl/ (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (reporting on the use of Black Hawk helicopters “armed with heavy weaponry . . . to bring down an 
aircraft” if necessary during the Super Bowl). 
10. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CONCEPT OF 
OPERATIONS FOR CBP’S PREDATOR B UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM. 63 (June 2010), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/cbp_uas_concept_of_operations.pdf [hereinafter U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROT.] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Additional payload upgrades [on drones] could include 
expendables or non-lethal weapons designed to immobilize [targets of interest].”); Sexton, supra note 3 (stating 
an opinion of a Texas LEA that “drones armed with an array of non-lethal force options—including impact 
rounds, chemical munition rounds, and tasers—could save lives”).  
11. See Chris Calabrese & Jay Stanley, Ban on Arming Domestic Drones: Let’s Draw a Line in the Sand, 
ACLU (June 15, 2012, 7:44 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-free-speech-national-
security/ban-arming-domestic-drones [hereinafter Ban on Arming Domestic Drones] (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that no armed drones should be used in the United States); Jennifer Lynch, 
Customs & Border Protection Considered Weaponizing Drones, EFF (July 2, 2013), https://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2013/07/customs-border-protection-considered-weaponizing-drones (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (stating the CBP should “not equip its Predators with any weapons—lethal or otherwise”). 
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UOF, including an explanation of unreasonable seizures and the appropriate UOF 
standard, the application of that standard to armed drones, and a discussion of 
whether armed drones require a new UOF standard. Part VI offers a comparison 
of current state and federal UOF policies and provides a model armed drone UOF 
policy in order to allow an officer to use an armed drone and stay within 
established Fourth Amendment principles. Part VII concludes that domestic 
armed drone use by an officer is constitutional but requires either a separate 
armed drone UOF policy or modification of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
reasonableness test in order to protect the public from excessive force. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DRONE TECHNOLOGY 
Drones12 have evolved significantly since the military began using them 
regularly in 2001.13 This section explores the non-military uses of drones as well 
as the expansion of drone technology for domestic law enforcement. 
A. Drones Used for War: What Else Are They Good For? 
In 2001, the U.S. military began using drones for reconnaissance purposes in 
Afghanistan.14 In 2002, the military added “Hellfire missiles” to its Predator 
drone system, “enabling reaction against intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, close air support, and interdiction targets.”15 Since then, the 
military and other private companies have continued to develop and deploy 
drones of various sizes and capabilities.16 Today, drones are actively used for 
 
12. Drones are “airborne vehicles that fly without an onboard human pilot, most often consisting of an 
aircraft, ground-based operating personnel, and one of various types of communications networks to connect the 
two.” Jeewon Kim et al., Unmanned Aerial Systems, 9 No. 4 A.B.A. SCITECH LAW. 54, 54–55 (2013). While 
drones are commonly thought of as aerial vehicles, there is a growing interest in other types of drones including 
ground drones and underwater drones. See, e.g., Armed Ground Drones to Take Over Battlefields in 5 Years, 
RT.COM, (Oct. 21, 2013, 8:57 PM), http://rt.com/usa/robotics-rodeo-ground-drones-512/ (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (stating a growing interest by the military in ground drones); Will Connors, 
Underwater Drones are Multiplying Fast, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2013, 7:55 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/ 
articles/SB10001424127887324183204578565460623922952 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating 
a growing interest in underwater drones). 
13. See generally Takahashi, supra note 7, at 83 (“[Drones] have seen considerable use overseas in the 
run-up to—and the aftermath of—the Second Gulf War. First generation drones carried only surveillance 
electronics . . . [l]ater generation drones were adapted to perform ‘hunter/killer’ missions; they carry both 
surveillance electronics and weapons.”). 
14. See generally Fact Sheet RQ-4 Global Hawk, U.S. AIR FORCE (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.af.mil/ 
AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (“The Global Hawk UAS provides near-continuous adverse-weather, day/night, wide area 
reconnaissance and surveillance.”). 
15. Fact Sheet, MQ-1B Predator, U.S. AIR FORCE (July 10, 2010), http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/ 
FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
16. See PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE, supra note 7, at 2–3 (listing various types 
of drones to include: “large fixed-wing,” “small fixed-wing,” drones that fit inside a backpack, drones the size 
of a small bird, and “blimps”). 
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various non-military applications including rescue, agricultural, and 
environmental operations.17 Potential future uses include “firefighting, flood 
monitoring, filmmaking, storm research, mining, aerial news coverage, 
construction, real-estate, cargo, [and] communications.”18  
B. Drones for Law Enforcement: The New Frontier 
As the Iraq and Afghanistan wars wind down and the United States opens the 
national airspace for drone use, drone manufacturers are shifting their focus 
towards offering LEAs unarmed, high-tech surveillance drones and armed 
drones. 
1. Drones for Domestic Surveillance 
The majority of debate over a LEA’s drone use centers on surveillance.19 
Several drone manufacturers tailor their drones to law enforcement operations20 
by equipping drones with digital cameras, a Forward Looking Infrared21 (“FLIR”) 
system,22 and “advanced data collection and storage, as well as the live streaming 
of data in the form of videos . . . . [and] GPS connectivity.”23 Drone denouncers 
argue that the use of surveillance drones “infringes upon fundamental privacy 
 
17. See MICHAEL TOSCANO, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ROADMAP TO THE FUTURE, ASSOCIATION 
FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL 18 (2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/ 
documents/environ/MToscano-5-4-13.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (citing examples of drone 
use to include: saving a life in a vehicle accident, “spraying crops for pest control,” and monitoring “wildlife 
species”). 
18. Id. at 10. Additionally, drones are being considered for a myriad of other potential applications. See 
Kim, supra note 12, at 59 (listing “potential personal uses of [drones]” to include: “adventure photography, 
science and discovery, child/pet monitoring, [and] herd[ing] animals”).  
19. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, DRONES IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 1 (Apr. 3, 2013), available at http://www. 
fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the widely contested 
debate over the use of drones in “domestic surveillance operations”). 
20. See, e.g., Public Safety, Law Enforcement, VANGUARD DEF. INDUS., http://vanguarddefense. 
com/public-safety/law-enforcement/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) [hereinafter VANGUARD DEF. INDUS.] (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Vanguard Defense Industries is committed to supporting our public safety 
professional with an exceptional platform [UAS] to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and apprehension.”); 
Who We Serve, SWAT & Police Robot, ARA FORCE PROTECTION, http://www.araforcepro.com/who-we-
serve/first-responder-police/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (offering 
products including a “Nighthawk Micro UA[S]” to law enforcement); Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Qube: 
Public Safety Small UAS, AV AEROVIRONMENT, http://www.avinc.com/uas/small_uas/qube/ (last visited Mar. 
15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (offering a small UAS to first responders capable of 
“transmitting live video directly to the operator”). 
21. REG’L CMTY. POLICING TRAINING INST. AT WICHITA ST. U., FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED (FLIR) 1, 
available at http://webs.wichita.edu/depttools/depttoolsmemberfiles/rcpi/COPS%20Act%20Papers/COPS%20 
ACT%20FLIR.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[FLIR] is a night vision enhancement system 
with many potential applications in law enforcement agencies.”). 
22. VANGUARD DEF. INDUS., supra note 20. 
23. Kim, supra note 12, at 55. 
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interests and the ability to freely associate with others.”24 Those in favor of drone 
use argue that it has many benefits including “protecting public safety, patrolling 
our nation’s borders, and investigating and enforcing environmental and criminal 
law violations.”25 Despite the benefits of surveillance drones, as more 
government agencies use them, individuals may experience diminished privacy.26 
However, as LEAs subject the public to increased drone surveillance, it may 
ultimately give the Supreme Court the opportunity to address privacy laws in 
light of these new technologies.27 
2. Armed Drones for Law Enforcement 
As LEAs consider ways to cut costs while still protecting the public, drones 
have become increasingly more attractive.28 Currently, drones built for law 
enforcement or military purposes can be equipped with many different types of 
weapons. For example, Vanguard Defense Industries’ ShadowHawk drone can 
be “fitted with a variety of ‘less lethal’ munitions” which may include “impact 
rounds, chemical munition rounds, and tasers.”29 Vanguard also offers lethal 
weapons on the ShadowHawk, including: a “single or multiple shot 40mm 
grenade launcher, 25mm Grenade Launcher, [and a] 12g [gauge] shotgun” but 
presently drone manufacturers do not offer these lethal weapon capabilities to 
LEAs.30 
 
24. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 1.  
25. Id. 
26. Takahashi, supra note 7, at 113. 
27. Id. This important legal debate over the use of drones for surveillance purposes and their potential 
Fourth Amendment violation has been written about extensively and is beyond the scope of this Comment. See, 
e.g., id. at 77 (addressing various issues surrounding the police use of a drone for surveillance purposes); Chris 
Schlag, The New Privacy Battle: How the Expanding Use of Drones Continues to Erode Our Concept of 
Privacy and Privacy Rights, 13 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2013); Ajoke Oyegunle, Drones in the 
Homeland: A Potential Privacy Obstruction Under the Fourth Amendment and the Common Law Trespass 
Doctrine, 21 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 365, 366 (2013). 
28. See Therese Postel, State Police Increasingly Turn to Drones to Monitor U.S. Citizens, POLICYMIC 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.policymic.com/articles/3433/state-police-increasingly-turn-to-drones-to-monitor-u-
s-citizens (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (highlighting potential financial and safety benefits drone 
use offers to a LEA).  
29. Sexton, supra note 3. A taser is a “weapon that subdues its targets with jolts of electricity.” Bruce 
Weber, Jack Cover, 88, Physicist Who Invented the Taser Stun Gun, Dies, NY TIMES (Feb. 16, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/us/16cover.html?_r=0 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Jack 
Cover invented the first taser which he originally called the “Thomas Swift Electric Rifle” or TSER and later 
added the A to create the acronym TASER. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Vanguard Defense Industries 
is not the only company developing drones with non-lethal weapon capabilities. A firm called Chaotic Moon 
recently created a drone helicopter armed with an 80,000 volt taser deployable by its remote pilot. Brent Rose, 
Meet CUPID: The Drone That Will Shoot You with an 80,000 Volt Taser, GIZMODO (Mar. 7, 2014, 6:40 PM), 
http://gizmodo.com/meet-cupid-the-drone-that-will-shoot-you-with-an-80-00-1539064715/all (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review).  
30. Specifications, VANGUARD DEF. INDUS., http://vanguarddefense.com/specifications/ (last visited Mar. 
15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) currently uses Predator 
drones to patrol the United States’ borders and has allowed the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), Secret Service, Texas Rangers, and other local law 
enforcement to use Predator drones in similar situations.31 While LEAs currently 
use these drones only for surveillance purposes, a DHS report to Congress in 
2010 left open the idea of placing “non-lethal weapons designed to immobilize 
[targets of interest]” on the Predator drones.32 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress has passed a number of laws in an effort to establish a legal 
framework for the domestic use of military grade force. Two bear relevance on 
drone usage in the United States: The Posse Comitatus Act33 and the FAA Act.34 
A. The Legality of LEA Drone Usage Under the Posse Comitatus Act 
Since the time of the Revolutionary War, the United States has grappled with 
how and to what extent local agencies should use federal military forces and 
equipment to enforce domestic law.35 In the aftermath of the Civil War, federal 
troops under the authority of the President established a “cruel and freewheeling 
martial law” in the southern states.36 Recognizing the problem with this 
unchecked use of military authority, Congress enacted the Posse Comitatus Act 
in 1878.37 Over the years, federal courts have interpreted, and Congress has 
codified, exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. 
In United States v. Red Feather, a district court found that the Posse 
Comitatus Act “does not [pertain to] the use of Army or Air Force equipment or 
material.”38 The court went on to state that “[t]he prevention of the use of military 
supplies and equipment was never mentioned in the debates [over the Posse 
 
31. Declan McCullagh, DHS Build Domestic Surveillance Tech into Predator Drones, CNET (Mar. 2, 
2013, 11:30 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57572207-38/dhs-built-domestic-surveillance-tech-into-
predator-drones/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
32. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 10, at 63. 
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006). 
34. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–95, §§ 331–36, 126 Stat. 11, 72–77. 
35. John D. Gates, Don’t Call Out the Marines: An Assessment of the Posse Comitatus Act, 13 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 1467, 1470–73 (1982).  
36. Id. at 1472–73.  
37. Id. at 1473. The current version of the The Posse Comitatus Act states: 
“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or 
Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or 
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two 
years, or both.”  
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).  
38. 392 F. Supp. 916, 921 (D.S.D. 1975). 
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Comitatus Act], nor can it reasonably be read into the words of the Act.”39 
Additionally, Congress codified express authorization of the use of military 
equipment and facilities to “any Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement 
official for law enforcement purposes.”40 More recently, officers in North Dakota 
called in a Predator drone from a local Air Force base to provide surveillance 
during a standoff situation resulting in “the first known arrests of U.S. citizens on 
U.S. soil with help from a Predator.”41 Some legal scholars believe this scenario 
did not violate Posse Comitatus, even though the drone was based out of an Air 
Force base, because it belonged to the United States Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP).42 Therefore, a LEA’s use of a non-military armed drone likely 
does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act so long as the LEA owns the drone and 
the military does not become directly involved.43 
B. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act 
In 2012, Congress passed the FAA Act giving the Secretary of 
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and other federal 
agencies the authority to create a plan for public drone use.44 Additionally, the 
FAA Act requires the Secretary of Transportation to form agreements with 
“appropriate government agencies to simplify the process for issuing certificates 
of waiver or authorization45 . . . to operate public unmanned aircraft systems”46 in 
United States airspace.47 The FAA Act lists specific requirements that 
 
39. Id. at 922; see also U.S. v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Neb. 1974) (finding no violation of 
the Posse Comitatus Act by a LEA using “1,100 Star parachute flares, 100,000 rounds, M-16 ammunition, 100 
protective vests, 20 sniper rifles, [and] 15 unarmed armored personnel carriers” from the Army). 
40. 10 U.S.C § 372 (2012). 
41. Takahashi, supra note 7, at 74–75 (alteration accepted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Michael Peck, Predator Drone Sends North Dakota Man to Jail, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014, 7:27 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/01/27/predator-drone-sends-north-dakota-man-to-jail/ (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the conviction of the suspects arrested in North Dakota with the 
aid of a Predator drone). 
42. Takahashi, supra note 7, at 79. If the Predator was owned and operated by the Air Force when it 
assisted police, would the Posse Comitatus Act apply? See id. (stating Posse Comitatus applies only if there is 
direct involvement by the military).  
43. Id. 
44. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77. 
45. Id. § 334(c)(1). Since passage of the Act, the FAA has issued hundreds of certificates of authorization. 
See FOIA Responses, Public Operations (Governmental), Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FAA (last updated Aug. 
4, 2014), http://www.faa.gov/uas/public_operations/foia_responses/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(showing a breakdown of approved COA’s since April 26, 2012). 
46. A “‘public unmanned aircraft system’” must meet the same criteria as a public aircraft. FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 331, 126 Stat. 11, 72–77. A “‘public aircraft’” is 
any aircraft owned by the federal or state government or “a political subdivision of one of these governments.” 
49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41) (2006).  
47. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334(c)(1), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77 
(2012). 
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government agencies must follow in order to operate a drone over U.S. soil.48 
There is nothing in the FAA Act prohibiting or approving any type of armed 
drone use in the United States.49 
1. The FAA UAS50 Comprehensive Plan 
The FAA Act requires the Secretary of Transportation to meet with members 
of the aviation industry, Federal agencies that use drones,51 and members of the 
drone industry to “develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the 
integration of civil52 unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace 
system.”53 The plan provides the “overarching, interagency goals, objectives and 
approach.”54 It also acknowledges the need to consider various privacy and civil 
liberty concerns, but does not specifically mention the use of armed drones by 
LEAs.55 Instead, the plan emphasizes the need to keep these civil liberty issues in 
mind as the collaborating members work to integrate drones into the national 
airspace system.56 
When asked about the use of armed drones in the United States, Jim 
Williams, the head of the FAA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Office, 
emphasized that “existing rules already bar aircraft from using weapons” and 
those rules also apply to drones.57 Specifically, he mentioned that there are “rules 
in the books that deal with releasing anything from an aircraft, period. Those 
rules are in place and that would prohibit weapons from being installed on a civil 
aircraft.”58 A federal regulation states that “[n]o pilot in command of a civil 
 
48. See id. § 334(c)(2)(C) (stating the unmanned aircraft must weigh “4.4 pounds or less . . . operate[] (i) 
within the line of sight of the operator; (ii) less than 400 feet above the ground; (iii) during daylight conditions; 
(iv) within Class G airspace; and (v) outside of 5 statute miles from any . . . location with aviation activities”). 
49. Id. 
50. UAS stands for “Unmanned Aircraft System.” Id. § 331(9). 
51. Members included “the Departments of Transportation, Defense, Commerce, and Homeland Security 
as well as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration.” THE 
JOINT PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
(UAS) COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, A REPORT ON THE NATION’S UAS PATH FORWARD 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/UAS_Comprehensive_Plan.pdf 
[hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE PLAN] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
52. A “‘civil aircraft’ means any aircraft except a public aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(16) (2006). 
53. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77 
(2012). 
54. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 51, at 6. 
55. See id. at 7 (stating the significance of “privacy and civil liberties, physical security, and potential 
economic opportunities . . . in the development of [drone] policy”).  
56. See id. (“Integrating public and civil [drones] into the [national airspace] carries certain national 
security implications, including cyber and communications security, domestic framework for US government 
operations, national airspace and defense, airman vetting/general aviation, and privacy concerns.”).  
57. Ben Wolfgang, FAA Official: No Armed Drones in U.S., WASH. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www. 
washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/13/faa-official-no-armed-drones-us/?page=all (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). Members of the audience “scoffed at the question” and Mr. Williams “seemed amused by it.” Id. 
58. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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aircraft may allow any object to be dropped from that aircraft in flight that 
creates a hazard to persons or property.”59 Presuming that (1) Mr. Williams was 
referring to this rule in his answer, and (2) the word “object” in the rule includes 
a weapon, this rule applies only to civil aircraft and not public aircraft.60 The 
current text of the rule does not seem to forbid a LEA from arming its “public” 
drone.61 
2. The FAA Integration of UAS Roadmap 
The FAA Act requires the FAA to produce a five-year roadmap, through 
2017, for “the introduction of civil [drones] into the national airspace system.”62 
The FAA serves as both a regulator of aviation safety and as a service provider of 
air traffic control in the National Airspace System (NAS).63 The roadmap 
acknowledges the challenge of establishing a policy and regulatory framework 
for drone integration.64 It does not specifically mention armed drone use in the 
United States, but notes the need to establish regulations based on several factors 
in drone operations that could presumably include armed drones.65 
3. The Memorandum of Understanding Between the FAA and the DOJ 
The FAA and the Department of Justice (DOJ) created a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) to “implement a streamlined training and authorization 
process to enable [state] law enforcement agencies to operate [drones] within the 
United States safely, effectively, and lawfully.”66 This MOU meets the FAA 
Act’s requirement to “simplify the process for issuing certificates of waiver or 
 
59. 14 C.F.R. § 91.15 (2014) (emphasis added). 
60. See supra notes 46, 52. “[T]he FAA has no regulatory authority over [public aircraft operations] other 
than those requirements that apply to all aircraft operating in the [national airspace] . . . [and generally] 
regulations that include the term ‘civil aircraft’ in their applicability do not apply to [public aircraft 
operations].” FAA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR, PUBLIC AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS 3 (Feb. 12, 
2014), available at http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_00-1_1A.pdf (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
61. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
62. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(5), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77.  
63. FAA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., INTEGRATION OF CIVIL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) IN THE 
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (NAS) ROADMAP 14 (1st ed. 2013), available at http://www.faa.gov/ 
about/initiatives/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 16 (“[R]egulatory drivers include: [d]eveloping minimum standards for Sense and Avoid, 
Control and Communications . . . [u]nderstanding the privacy, security, and environmental implications of 
[drone] operations . . . [a]nd developing acceptable [drone] design standards that consider the aircraft size, 
performance, mode of control, intended operational environment, and mission criticality.”).  
66. Memorandum of Understanding Between FAA, UAS Integration Office, & The U.S. DOJ, Office of 
Justice Programs, Nat’l Inst. of Justice Concerning Operation of UAS by Law Enforcement Agencies 1 (2013), 
available at http://www.alea.org/assets/pressReleases/assets/1805/DOJ%20FAA%20MOU.pdf [hereinafter 
Memorandum of Understanding] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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authorization . . . to operate public [drones] in the [NAS].”67 Specifically, the 
National Institute of Justice, under the DOJ, worked with the FAA to implement 
the authorization of LEA drone use.68 The MOU establishes additional 
requirements for a LEA to gain authorization to operate a drone69 and also 
provides specific rules for flight operations.70 
C.  Legislative Responses to the FAA Act 
Amidst growing public concern about drone use in the United States, 
including ease of LEA approval and ambiguity in the FAA Act, Congress and 
state legislatures have proposed amendments to clarify how a LEA may use a 
drone.  
1. Federal Responses 
On March 12, 2013, Rep. Michael Burgess introduced the No Armed Drones 
Act of 2013 (NADA) as an amendment to the FAA Act.71 This amendment would 
prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from authorizing anyone to use a drone 
“as a weapon or to deliver a weapon against a person or property.”72 The 
amendment defines a “weapon” to include both “lethal and nonlethal weapons.”73 
This amendment remains in the committee process and has not moved out of 
committee since March 13, 2013.74 
2. State Responses: Split on Armed Drone Use 
In 2013, forty-three states introduced ninety-six bills on domestic drone use, 
and eight states ultimately passed new drone laws.75 The new state drone laws 
 
67. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334(c), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77 
(2012).  
68. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 66, at 2. 
69. Id. at 5 (stating a LEA must submit a Safety Risk Analysis Plan, operate the drone in a “‘Defined 
Incident Perimeter,’” (DIP) and only use drones that weigh no more than twenty-five pounds).  
70. Id. at 7 (stating the LEA must operate the drone within a stationary DIP no higher than 400 feet above 
ground level, during daylight hours, in the pilot and at least one observer’s sight, with no pursuit missions 
outside the DIP, and no flights over groups of people or major roadways). While the MOU is helpful, it does not 
establish permanent drone requirements because it is subject to change. Id. at 4. 
71. No Armed Drones Act of 2013, H.R. 1083, 113th Cong. (2013). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
74. CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1083 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review).  
75. See Allie Bohm, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of State Legislation Passed This Year, ACLU 
(Nov. 7, 2013 8:50 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/year-drone-roundup-legislation-
passed-year (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the drone laws passed by Florida, Idaho, 
Illinois, Montana, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and Texas).  
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take different approaches to armed drones.76 For example, Virginia completely 
prohibits the use of armed drones.77 Florida’s definition of a lawful LEA drone 
includes one that “[c]an carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.”78 Oregon’s drone 
law states “[a] public body may not operate a drone that is capable of firing a 
bullet or other projectile, directing a laser or otherwise being used as a weapon.”79 
Other states do not mention armed drones at all.80 
As states debate drone use, several groups have developed model rules or 
points for state legislatures.81 The Aerospace States Association, the Council of 
State Governments, and the National Conference of State Legislatures advise 
states to consider “prohibiting weapons to be carried by any [drone] in 
commercial airspace.”82 The International Association of Chiefs of Police 
Aviation Committee (IACP) “strongly discourage[s]” any weapons on LEA 
drones because it believes current technology will not give a LEA “the ability to 
effectively deploy weapons from a small [drone].”83 The IACP also reasons that 
“public acceptance of airborne use of force is likewise doubtful and could result 
in unnecessary community resistance to the program.”84 However, this Comment 
proposes model language for an armed drone UOF policy that strikes a better 




77. Va. Acts H.B 2012, Ch. 755 (2013). 
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50(2) (West Supp. 2013). 
79. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.365 (West Supp. 2014).  
80. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 167/5 (West Supp. 2014) (stating no language regarding armed 
drones); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21–213 (West Supp. 2014) (stating no language regarding armed drones); TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.001 (West Supp. 2014) (stating no language regarding armed drones); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 46–5–109 (West Supp. 2013) (stating no language regarding armed drones). 
81. See AEROSPACE STATES ASS’N, UAS PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS 1–2 (2013), available at 
http://aerostates.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/UAS-State-Privacy-Considerations-Final2.pdf (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that the Aerospace States Association, the Council of State Governments, 
and the National Conference of State Legislatures have created considerations for legislators developing UAS 
legislation). 
82. Id. The FAA divides commercial airspace into several classes. FAA, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSPORTATION, AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION POLICY, ORDER JO 7400.9X § 1000 (Aug. 7, 2013), available 
at http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/JO_7400.9X.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). Generally, Class A airspace is an altitude of 18,000 feet and above. Id. at § 2000. The remaining Class 
B, C, D, and E airspace altitude levels generally vary by state. Id. at § § 3000, 4000, 5000, 6000. Any airspace 
not covered by one of these classes is uncontrolled and falls under Class G airspace. Id. at § 1000. The FAA Act 
allows a LEA to operate a drone “less than 400 feet above the ground . . . within Class G airspace.” FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334(c)(2)(C), 126 Stat. 11, 72–77 (2012).  
83. AVIATION COMM., INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 2 (2012), available at http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/iacp_uaguidelines.pdf (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
84. Id. 
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Before a LEA uses an armed drone in daily operations, the agency and the 
public it serves need to weigh the possible effects of using this new technology as 
a matter of public policy.85 Opponents of armed drones assert that allowing LEAs 
to operate and use armed drones within the United States “would be the latest and 
arguably most extreme example of the militarization of our police.”86 The public 
is becoming increasingly skeptical of LEAs who continue to acquire the same or 
similar weapons and tools as the military.87 A recent poll “finds the American 
public supports many applications of [drone] technology . . . [r]outine policing88 
though, [was] not among them.”89 The ACLU believes it will be easier for a LEA 
to use force against the public, and therefore “force will be used more . . . [and 
armed] [d]rones may also be more likely to result in harm to innocent 
bystanders.”90 In 2004, Amnesty International made similar arguments when 
officers started using tasers to subdue suspects.91 They expressed concern that 
officers were “overusing the Taser . . . because Taser markets it as nonlethal, 
[and] officers often use it on unruly suspects, not just as an alternative to deadly 
force.”92 The ACLU contends that tasers are unsafe, and that officers continue to 
 
85. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Cusac, The Trouble with Tasers, THE PROGRESSIVE (May 2005), available at 
http://progressive.org/mag_amctaser (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the use of tasers by 
law enforcement and whether tasers are actually safe to use on humans).  
86. Ban on Arming Domestic Drones, supra note 11. 
87. See DIANE CECILIA WEBER, WARRIOR COPS: THE OMINOUS GROWTH OF PARAMILITARISM IN 
AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS, CATO INSTITUTE BRIEFING PAPERS 1 (Aug. 26, 1999), available at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/bp50.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing 
how beginning in the 1980s, various police agencies across the United States have been getting trained and 
equipped by the U.S. military). “Confusing the police function with the military function can lead to dangerous 
and unintended consequences-such as unnecessary shootings and killings.” Id.; see also ACLU Launches 
Nationwide Investigation into Police Use of Military Technology & Tactics, ACLU (Mar. 6, 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform/aclu-launches-nationwide-investigation-police-use-military-
technology-tactics (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Equipping state and local law enforcement with 
military weapons and vehicles, military tactical training, and actual military assistance to conduct traditional 
law enforcement erodes civil liberties and encourages increasingly aggressive policing.”). 
88. Query whether Americans would consider using drones for “routine police activity.” See Monmouth 
University Poll, U.S. Supports Some Domestic Drone Use, MONMOUTH UNIV. 1 (June 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.monmouth.edu/assets/0/32212254770/32212254991/32212254992/3221225 
4994/32212254995/30064771087/42e90ec6a27c40968b911ec51eca6000.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (showing a majority of Americans oppose using a drone to enforce speeding violations but support 
using a drone for “‘special circumstances’” such as “search and rescue . . . track[ing] down runaway 
criminals . . . and control[ing] illegal immigration”). 
89. Id.  
90. Ban on Arming Domestic Drones, supra note 11. 
91. See Alex Berenson, As Police Use of Tasers Soars, Questions Over Safety Emerge, NY TIMES (July 18, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/18/us/as-police-use-of-tasers-soars-questions-over-safety-emerge.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (discussing concerns over taser safety).  
92. Id. 
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overuse them.93 These same arguments will probably apply to officers using 
armed drones when they become as common as tasers.94 
On the other hand, LEAs insist that armed drones would benefit the public by 
saving officers’ lives.95 The cost to operate a drone also benefits LEAs because 
drones are “much cheaper than helicopters or other aircraft—and they cost much 
less to operate per hour than do other aircraft.”96 Additionally, drones “will make 
certain activities easier, safer, [and] more efficient . . . [a]t a time when many 
states are saddled with enormous debt.”97 Not surprisingly, officers made similar 
arguments to justify the increasing use of tasers in law enforcement.98 Despite 
concerns, some LEAs will likely provide armed drones to officers as another tool 
to keep them safe and to reduce costs.99 
V. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE USE OF FORCE 
This section explores how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment’s “unreasonable seizure” clause established the UOF standard that 
applies to officers making arrests and detentions. Additionally, this section 
applies the current UOF standard to armed drone use by analogizing to real cases 
and scenarios and discusses whether armed drones require a new UOF standard. 
A. What Is a Seizure? 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”100 A person may bring a civil action under 
section 1983 against a government actor for a violation of his or her Fourth 
Amendment rights.101 In order to bring a section 1983 action, the plaintiff must 
show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable.102 
 
93. See Rebecca McCray & Emma Andersson, Tasers No Longer a Non-Lethal Alternative for Law 
Enforcement, ACLU (May 3, 2012, 3:39 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/tasers-no-longer-
non-lethal-alternative-law-enforcement (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (citing safety issues with 
tasers causing “cardiac arrest and death” as well as the “disturbing trend of officers using Tasers in flagrantly 
unnecessary situations”); Ban on Arming Domestic Drones, supra note 11 (“Tasers are often used in clearly 
unnecessary situations–for example, in retaliation against nonviolent people who have angered a police 
officer.”). 
94. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
95. Sexton, supra note 3. 
96. Postel, supra note 28. 
97. Id. 
98. Berenson, supra note 91 (stating the use of tasers “lowers the risk of injury to officers . . . [a]nd 
Tasers are surely safer than firearms.”). 
99. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
100. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Additionally, a law enforcement officer must have probable cause to seize a 
person. Id. 
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
102. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989). 
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In United States v. Mendenhall, the Court held that “a person has been 
‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of 
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 
believed he was not free to leave.”103 The Court established two instances where a 
seizure occurs, either through “physical force or [a] show of authority.”104 Seizure 
by physical force occurs when a person or their property is intentionally 
detained.105 A seizure “by a show of authority” requires actual submission, 
otherwise it constitutes an “attempted seizure.”106 
B. What Is a Reasonable Use of Force? 
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court determined that the “use of deadly force to 
prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon” was 
unconstitutional.107 In Garner, an officer shot a prowler suspect in the back of the 
head as he was climbing over a chain link fence.108 The officer believed the 
suspect would get away if he climbed completely over the fence.109 The State of 
Tennessee, by statute, allowed an officer to use “all the necessary means to effect 
[an] arrest” of a suspect who flees or resists, including deadly force.110 The Court 
held the statute unconstitutional when used to apply “deadly force against . . . 
fleeing [nonviolent] suspects.”111 The Court found that “it is not constitutionally 
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force” only when “the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, 
either to the officer or to others.”112 
In Graham v. Connor, the Court established the constitutional standard for an 
“excessive force [claim] in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or 
other ‘seizure’ of [a] person.”113 In Graham, the petitioner, a diabetic, “sustained 
a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder” 
because officers utilized physical force when conducting an investigative stop 
 
103. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). The Court lists several examples of a possible seizure to include: “the 
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the 
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s 
request might be compelled.” Id.  
104. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007).  
105. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 (citations omitted).  
106. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254. 
107. 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). 
108. Id. at 3–4. 
109. Id. at 4. 
110. Id. at 4–5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111. Id. at 11. 
112. Id. at 11–12. 
(“[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that 
he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical 
harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some 
warning has been given.”). 
113. 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 
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based on suspicion that he was drunk.114 The Court held that “all claims that law 
enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of 
an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather 
than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.”115 Under this rule, “the question 
is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts 
and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 
motivation.”116 Objective reasonableness “requires careful attention to the facts 
and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at 
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers 
or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest 
by flight.”117 The Court also found that the “‘reasonableness’ of a particular use 




In Scott v. Harris, the Court considered whether an officer could use force 
that posed a risk of injury or death to a suspect in order to stop the suspect from 
“endangering the lives of innocent bystanders.”119 In Scott, an officer attempted a 
“Precision Intervention Technique maneuver, which cause[d] the fleeing vehicle 
to spin to a stop.”120 The officer incorrectly applied the maneuver to a fleeing 
suspect’s vehicle, causing the suspect to crash and sustain permanent, severe 
injuries.121 The respondent argued that the officer’s actions amounted to deadly 
force and therefore the preconditions established in Garner applied to this case.122 
The Court found that “Garner [does] not establish a magical on/off switch that 
triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly 
force.’”123 Under the “reasonableness” test set forth in Graham, “all that matters 
is whether [the officer’s] actions were reasonable.”124 The Court held that the 
reasonableness test includes weighing the “number of lives at risk” and the 
“relative culpability” of those lives.125 The officer’s actions were reasonable in 
 
114. Id. at 388–90. 
115. Id. at 395. 
116. Id. at 397. 
117. Id. at 396. 
118. Id. at 396–97 (“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police 
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”). 
119. 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007). 
120. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121. Id. (stating the suspect became a quadriplegic).  
122. Id. at 381–82 (stating the following preconditions: “(1) The suspect must have posed an immediate 
threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others; (2) deadly force must have been necessary to prevent 
escape; and (3) where feasible, the officer must have given the suspect some warning”). 
123. Id. at 382. 
124. Id. at 382–83. 
125. Id. at 384. 
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this case because “those who might have been harmed had [the officer] not taken 
the action he did were entirely innocent.”126 
Courts continue to use the Graham test when analyzing section 1983 
excessive force claims.127 
C. Applying the Use of Force Standard to Armed Drone Use 
Today, lower courts frequently apply the Supreme Court UOF 
reasonableness test to section 1983 excessive force claims against LEAs.128 The 
following section analyzes how the use of an armed drone would change the 
reasonable UOF analysis in the following cases and scenarios: deploying 
chemical control spray,129 using a taser,130 applying lethal force during an armed 
bank robbery,131 and deploying a K-9 police dog.132 
1. Using an Armed Drone to Deploy Chemical Control Spray 
In a 2013 Louisiana case, Elphage v. Gautreaux, officers detained two 
individuals suspected of fleeing the scene of a shooting.133 While officers 
detained them, fifteen to twenty people converged on the scene, and another 
officer arrived with his K-9 dog “form[ing] a barrier between the crowd and the 
deputies detaining the two suspects.”134 The officers verbally warned the crowd 
that pepper spray would be used “if they did not ‘get back.’”135 One or more of 
the officers eventually used pepper spray on the crowd.136 One member of the 
 
126. Id. 
127. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
(“Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner’s analysis, and hold that all claims that 
law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, 
investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.”). 
Scott, 550 U.S. at 383–84 (incorporating a balancing test within the Graham test). In order to overcome 
qualified immunity, the plaintiff may also show that the constitutional right was “clearly established.” See 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232–36 (2009) (holding that addressing the “clearly established” prong is 
not required in every case). 
128. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pena, 28 F. Supp. 3d 423, 429–31 (D.Md. 2014) (applying the Supreme Court 
UOF reasonableness test to an excessive force claim for using deadly force).  
129. See, e.g., Elphage v. Gautreaux, 939 F. Supp. 2d 493, 497–98 (M.D.La. 2013) (stating an excessive 
force claim from chemical control spray). 
130. See, e.g., Lash v. Lemke, 971 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (stating an excessive force claim for 
deploying a taser). 
131. Botched L.A. Bank Heist Turns into Bloody Shootout, CNN (Feb. 28, 1997, 11:10 PM), http://www. 
cnn.com/US/9702/28/shootout.update/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
132. See, e.g., White v. City of Lagrange, Ga., 952 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356–57 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (stating 
an excessive force claim for deploying a K-9 dog).  
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crowd was arrested for “public intimidation, resisting arrest by force, and simple 
assault.”137 The court found that the officer’s actions were “objectively reasonable 
under the circumstances” and any injuries members of the crowd suffered were 
minor.138 
Suppose that rather than a K-9 officer arriving to keep the crowd back, an 
officer arrived and deployed a drone to form a barrier between the crowd and the 
officers and give the officers the ability to fire pepper spray from the air. The 
officers warned the crowd to stay back or they would be pepper sprayed while an 
officer at the scene operated the drone with the help of an observer.139 The crowd 
refused to comply, and the drone operator pepper sprayed the crowd. 
Here, under the Graham standard,140 a court would likely find that the drone 
use was reasonable in light of the belligerent crowd surrounding the officers. 
First, the officers dealt with a severe crime—a shooting. Second, the crowd 
posed an immediate threat to officer and public safety as it grew more belligerent 
and intimidated all of the officers at the scene, including the drone operator. 
Finally, because the officer controlling the drone was on the scene and able to 
assess the situation, the court would likely conclude that the force was 
appropriate.141 
If the officer controlling the drone was not at the scene, a court might find 
the UOF unreasonable because the crowd did not pose an immediate danger to 
the officer initiating the force by maneuvering the drone and deploying pepper 
spray.142 For a court to find the force reasonable, the drone operator would have 
to rely on communications with officers actually at the scene before deploying 
the pepper spray.143 Additionally, unless an officer at the scene felt threatened or 
believed that a member of the public was in danger, a court would likely deem 
the deployment of pepper spray by a remotely operated drone unreasonable.144 
In this situation, the analysis of the UOF by the drone and by the officers in 
the real case is substantially similar.145 The only difference is how officers 
deployed the pepper spray—by hand versus by drone. However, the 
 
137. Id. at 510. 
138. Id. 
139. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334(c)(2)(C), 126 Stat. 11, 
72–77 (requiring the drone to be “within the line of sight of the operator”). 
140. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (stating objective reasonableness “requires careful 
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, 
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”). “The calculus of reasonableness must embody 
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation.” Id. at 396–97.  
141. “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene.” Id. at 396. 
142. See supra notes 139–41. 
143. See supra note 139. 
144. See supra note 141. 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 138–41. 
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reasonableness analysis potentially changes once the officer operating the drone 
is no longer “on the scene.”146 
2. Using an Armed Drone to Employ a Taser 
In a 2013 District of Columbia case, Lash v. Lemke, officers posted notices 
on “Occupy DC” protesters’ tents, informing them of the “government’s intent to 
enforce no-camping regulations.”147 Officers tased the plaintiff after he removed 
the notices, attempted to flee the officers, and physically resisted arrest.148 Video 
footage of the arrest showed the plaintiff yelling at the officers and walking away 
from them, as well as a gathering crowd yelling at the officers.149 The court found 
that the force was reasonable because “the officers were in a hostile environment 
where protesters were yelling at and following the officers while [they] attempted 
to arrest [the plaintiff].”150 Additionally, the court concluded that a “reasonable 
officer on the scene would have believed [the plaintiff] was actively resisting 
arrest . . . [and] posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or 
others.”151 
The plaintiff asserted that he was unarmed and was not threatening at any 
point during the confrontation.152 The officers argued, and the court found, that 
“[t]here is always a potential threat to officers when they are that close to an 
individual who they are trying to arrest, because the individual may try to grab 
one of the officer’s weapons or actually hit an officer trying to arrest him.”153 The 
plaintiff also claimed that using a taser was unreasonable because the officers did 
not warn him before using the taser.154 The court found that “whether a warning is 
given . . . is not a dispositive factor.”155 
Suppose the officers deployed a drone armed with a taser device over the 
crowd while the officers posted notices of the government’s intent to enforce the 
law. An officer operated the drone on site, but did not go with the officers 
 
146. Id.  
147. 971 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2013). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 88–90. 
150. Id. at 95 (“Viewing the situation from the perspective of an officer at the scene, as the court must, 
[the officer’s] use of the taser gun . . . was reasonably proportionate to the difficult and uncertain situation that 
the . . . officers faced.”). The court also considered the fact that the officers were among a large protest, there 
were many tents within the protest area, and the officers “‘reasonably could have anticipated a confrontation’ 
while removing an uncooperative protester from the tent camp.” Id.  
151. Id. at 96. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
154. Id. at 97. 
155. Id. (“An order stating that a warning shall be given ‘if practicable’ cannot be construed to require a 
warning in all situations.”). Id. at 98. 
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posting the notices.156 When the protester physically resisted arrest and fled the 
officers, they communicated with the drone operator, giving him a description of 
the protester and the direction in which he fled. The drone operator located the 
protester with the drone camera, hovered over him, and shot him with a taser 
without warning. The officers made their way through the crowd and arrested the 
immobilized protester. 
Here, the protester never posed an immediate threat to the drone operator 
because he was not near the operator at any point during the confrontation.157 
Additionally, while the protester was attempting to evade arrest, he did not pose 
an immediate threat to the officers when he was tased because he was not close 
to them.158 The protester could also argue that he had not committed a severe 
crime because he was unarmed and simply tearing down notices.159 Finally, he 
could present evidence that the officers failed to warn him that a drone would 
taser him if he refused to stop.160 
On the other hand, because the officers faced a hostile crowd while trying to 
make an arrest, a court might hold the use of force reasonable. Additionally, a 
court would likely find that, because the officers had already tried and failed to 
arrest the protestor, the officers reasonably believed that the protestor was 
evading arrest.161 However, because neither the drone operator nor the pursuing 
officers faced immediate danger from the protester at the time the drone operator 
deployed the taser, a court would likely find the force unreasonable.162 There is no 
evidence to suggest that the protester posed an immediate threat of harm to others 
because the crowd was part of his same protest. If the protester had been standing 
around the crowd waving a firearm at everyone, there would be a stronger case 
for deploying a taser via drone because the protestor would pose an immediate 
threat to others and officers would not be able to get close to the protester to 
make an arrest.163 
In this situation, the analysis of the UOF by the drone and by the officers in 
the real case is different because the real case involved officers in close 
proximity to the suspect, whereas in the drone scenario the officers were some 
distance away from the suspect and not in immediate danger. The crowd might 
 
156. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 334(c)(2)(C), 126 Stat. 11, 
72–77 (2012) (requiring the drone to be “within the line of sight of the operator”). 
157. See supra note 140. 
158. See supra note 140. 
159. Id. 
160. See supra text accompanying note 155. 
161. See supra text accompanying note 150. 
162. See Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 883 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding officers’ use of pepperball 
projectiles to disperse a party was unreasonable because there was no evidence the officers were in immediate 
danger). 
163. See supra note 140. 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46 
563 
have threatened officers, but a court would still likely find the deployment of a 
taser by drone unreasonable.164 
3. Using a Lethally Armed Drone 
In 1997, two heavily-armed men unsuccessfully tried to rob a bank in North 
Hollywood, California.165 After police responded to the bank robbery, the 
suspects made their escape by moving into a crowded neighborhood.166 For an 
hour, the suspects and police exchanged gunfire.167 “Wearing body armor and 
carrying a trunk full of weapons, the robbers . . . fired armor-piercing bullets at 
anything that moved, and one suspect used a getaway car as a shield.”168 
Eventually, both suspects were “killed by helmeted police who fired bullets to 
the head at close range.”169 
Now suppose during this intense gun battle officers deployed a drone armed 
with a twelve-gauge shotgun. An officer operated a drone from a mobile 
command center set up a few blocks from the bank and had been tracking the 
suspects the entire time. Once officers surrounded the two suspects on a 
neighborhood street, they radioed the drone operator to open fire because they 
could not get close enough to shoot the suspects and they judged the situation 
safe enough for drone use. The drone operator fatally shot both suspects from the 
air, ending the standoff. 
Here, a court would clearly find that deadly force is reasonable because the 
suspects posed a serious threat of physical harm to officers and the general 
public.170 While the dangerous situation clearly justified the officers’ use of 
deadly force, they could not shoot because the gunmen were continually firing at 
them. A court would likely find that a reasonable officer at the scene could 
command the drone operator to use deadly force. Therefore, the force would 
almost certainly be reasonable because the drone operator received a direct 
command to use deadly force based on observations of an officer at the scene.171 
In this situation, the UOF analysis for using the drone parallels the UOF 
analysis for an on-scene officer shooting because an on-scene officer ordered the 
drone to fire and the suspects clearly posed a threat to the officers on the scene 
 
164. See Nelson, 685 F.3d at 883 (finding there was a clear distinction between individuals posing an 
immediate threat to officers and the plaintiff who was not an immediate threat). 





170. See Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 818 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding an officer’s use of deadly 
force was reasonable against an armed robbery suspect who fled the scene of the robbery and was “lying in 
wait” in a residential area).  
171. See supra note 140. 
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and the public.172 Additionally, even if the drone operator had fired without being 
told to do so by officers, a court may find the action reasonable because the 
officer could determine the suspects were a threat to the public based on what the 
officer could see with the drone camera.173 
4. Pursuit Using an Armed Drone Instead of a K–9 Dog 
In 2010, an officer responded to a call about a possible kidnapper walking 
down a street.174 The officer found the suspect and told him to “place his hands on 
the patrol car.”175 The suspect would not let the officer get behind him despite a 
warning that the officer “could deploy his K–9 if necessary.”176 When the suspect 
started running, the officer “deployed his K–9, which caught up with [the 
suspect] and bit him on the arm.”177 The court compared this case to an earlier 
case where an armed robbery suspect crashed his car after being pursued by 
multiple officers and then ran into the woods.178 In that case, the court held that 
the officer reasonably deployed the K–9 because, along with other factors, “all 
three of the Graham factors179 weighed heavily against the plaintiff.”180 In White, 
the court found that the suspect “was suspected of the serious crime of felony 
kidnapping and was actively fleeing from [the officer], creating a danger to the 
community.”181 The court also reasoned that, because the officer was alone, “his 
need to use the K–9 to ensure his safety and the safety of the community was 
even greater” and therefore the officer reasonably used his K–9.182 
Suppose both officers who responded to the call were trained and certified 
drone operators who carried the police drone in the trunk of their vehicle. Despite 
warning the suspect that they would deploy a drone armed with beanbag rounds 
to pursue him, the suspect fled. The officers deployed their drone, found the 
suspect, and shot him with several beanbag rounds to keep him from fleeing. 
Here, a court would likely find that the use of force by a drone was as 
reasonable as deploying a K–9 in White because (1) the scenario fell within the 
Graham factors,183 (2) both officers who used the drone were actually at the 
 
172. Id. 
173. See infra Part V.D (discussing how a court could analyze the reasonableness of an officer using an 
armed drone without guidance from an officer on the scene). 
174. White v. City of Lagrange, Ga., 952 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2013). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 1356–57. 
178. Id. at 1358. 
179. The court found that “the plaintiff was suspected of armed robbery, . . . actively fled from the police, 
and . . . the police had every reason to believe that he was armed and dangerous.” Id. 
180. Id. at 1358. 
181. Id. at 1359. 
182. Id.  
183. See supra note 179. 




 (3) there were only two officers on site and trying to pursue the suspect 
would create a greater danger to others,185 and (4) the officers warned the suspect 
that they would deploy the drone if he fled the scene.186 
D. Do Armed Drones Require a New Use of Force Standard? 
In applying the Graham standard to the use of an armed drone instead of an 
officer, it becomes clear that some factors are more dispositive than others. For 
example, “the severity of the crime at issue”187 analysis remains the same 
regardless of whether an officer or a drone applies the force because both would 
require that the level of force match the severity of the crime.188 For example, it 
would be unreasonable for an officer or a drone to shoot a shoplifter with a 
twelve-gauge shotgun to stop the crime of theft.189 Therefore, this factor should 
be included in an armed drone UOF standard. Another factor unchanged by 
drone use is whether the suspect is “actively resisting arrest or attempting to 
evade arrest by flight.”190 Standing alone, this factor would not change how a 
court looks at the reasonableness of UOF, either by drone or by officer, because 
both would depend on how strongly the suspect resists arrest or what methods a 
suspect uses in an attempt to flee.191 Therefore, this factor should also be part of 
an armed drone UOF standard. 
The most dispositive Graham factor requires a court to judge “[t]he 
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force . . . from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene.”192 The Supreme Court explained that 
“reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often 
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a 
particular situation.”193 How would an officer pass the “on the scene” perspective 
the Court requires when the officer is in a building relying only on the armed 
drone’s camera to make a decision to use force against a suspect on the street? 
While most officers are capable of making split-second judgments on the street 
or at the scene, officers operating drones have limited perspectives of the 
 
184. See supra note 140. 
185. See supra text accompanying note 179. 
186. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
187. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
188. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
189. Id. 
190. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
191. See Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 883 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating officers’ use of pepperball 
projectiles against individuals at a party was unreasonable force because “the officers had no interest in 
arresting them; and the group engaged in passive resistance, at most, by failing to immediately disperse if and 
when such an order was given”).  
192. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
193. Id. at 396–97. 
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situation.194 Therefore, without more, this factor would almost always lead a court 
to decide an officer’s use of an armed drone was unreasonable because the 
officer controlling the drone was not “on the scene.”195 
Another problematic factor for armed drones under the standard UOF 
analysis is “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers or others.”196 Obviously, suspects on the street do not pose an immediate 
threat to the officer operating the drone from a safe distance. But what if the 
officer can clearly see the suspect shooting people and no officer is at the scene? 
The officer can reasonably believe the suspect “poses an immediate threat to the 
safety of . . . others” because the officer can see the suspect shooting people 
through the drone camera.197 A court might find the UOF reasonable if the officer 
operating the drone could see that the suspect was about to injure a fellow officer 
on the street. In Scott v. Harris, the Court said “it is clear from the videotape that 
respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians 
who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers 
involved in the chase.”198 If officers recorded the drone camera feed, the court 
could analyze the immediate threat to safety similarly to the way it analyzed the 
issue in Scott.199 
Here, assuming the court did use the drone camera footage to find an 
imminent threat to public safety, the question remains: how does the lack of an 
officer on the scene affect the reasonable UOF analysis?200 In Scott, the officers 
were on the scene at all times in pursuit of the suspect.201 In order for a court to 
find the UOF reasonable in the limited circumstances where the officer via drone 
camera perceived—and the drone footage clearly showed—that the suspect 
posed a clear and imminent threat to public safety, it must deviate from the 
Graham standard because it could no longer judge the “reasonableness of a 
particular use of force . . . from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene.”
202
 Therefore, in limited circumstances, courts must essentially expand the 
definition of “on the scene” to include the “perspective of a reasonable officer” 
watching the scene through a drone camera.203 
However, use of an armed drone falls completely within the current Graham 
standard in some circumstances. For example, having an officer on the scene 
either controlling the drone or directing an off-scene drone operator will likely 
meet the “reasonable officer on the scene” factor because the circumstances 
 
194. See supra text accompanying notes 192–93. 
195. Id. 
196. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
197. Id. 
198. 550 U.S. 372, 384 (2007) (emphasis added). 
199. Id.  
200. See supra text accompanying note 197.  
201. Scott, 550 U.S. at 379–80. 
202. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
203. See supra text accompanying note 201. 
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involve someone physically present where the force will occur.204 The size of the 
scene is irrelevant. So long as an officer is directing the drone or drone operator 
to engage in force based on the Graham reasonableness factors, a court would 
likely find such use of an armed drone reasonable and no different than any other 
law enforcement tool.205 However, specific situations will undoubtedly arise 
requiring courts to either modify the current Graham standard to expand the “on 
the scene” factor or find the use of an armed drone unreasonable within the 
current standard.206 Until then, LEAs who desire to use armed drones will need to 
create an armed drone UOF policy that conforms to the existing Graham 
standard.207 
VI. CREATING A LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF FORCE POLICY 
FOR ARMED DRONES 
The following section considers actual UOF policies that state and federal 
LEAs have implemented and proposes a model UOF policy that encompasses the 
Graham standard while also seeking to minimize public skepticism over armed 
drone use. 
A. Current Law Enforcement Use of Force Policies 
Based on the reasonableness standards established by the Supreme Court, all 
state and federal LEAs have policies designed to minimize excessive force 
claims.208 
1. State LEA Use of Force Policies 
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department states that “determining 
whether force is ‘unreasonable’ shall be consistent with [Graham v. Connor].”209 
The policy also defines “objectively reasonable” to mean that “[d]epartment 
members shall evaluate each situation requiring the use of force in light of the 
known circumstances . . . in determining the necessity for force and the 
appropriate level of force.”210 
 
204. See supra Part V.C.1. 
205. Id. 
206. Scott, 550 U.S. at 381–83 “[I]n the end, we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of 
‘reasonableness.’” Id. at 383. 
207. Infra Part VI.B. 
208. Infra Part VI.A.1–2. 
209. L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF USE OF FORCE POLICY 2, available at http://www.lasdhq.org/divisions/ 
leadership-training-div/bureaus/mpp/force-policy.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
210. Id. (listing examples of known circumstances to include: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether 
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the member of others, and whether the suspect is actively 
resisting”).  
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The Chicago Police Department gives the same reasonableness guidelines as 
the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, but also gives its officers a UOF 
Model “in order to provide members guidance on the reasonableness of a 
particular response option.”211 The UOF Model classifies an individual interacting 
with an officer as a “cooperative subject,” “resister,” or “assailant.”212 When a 
person is considered a resister or assailant, the model gives increasing methods of 
physical control over the individual.213 For example, an officer may begin by 
physically holding a person who qualifies as a resister.214 As the resister becomes 
increasingly difficult to control, the officer may use chemical spray, a taser, or a 
canine.215 If the person moves into the assailant category, the officer may use 
impact weapons, munitions, or deadly force.216 
The Boston Police Department (BPD) has three separate policies that outline 
the use of non-lethal force,217 less lethal force,218 and deadly force.219 In the non-
lethal force policy, the BPD includes the Graham v. Connor rule regarding use of 
force.220 The policy generally restricts non-lethal force to “defensive situations 
where (1) an officer or other person is attacked, or (2) an officer is met with 
physical resistance during an encounter.”221 The policy also allows an officer to 
 
211. CHI. POLICE DEP’T, USE OF FORCE GUIDELINES, GEN. ORDER G03–02, CHICAGOPOLICE.ORG (last 
updated Sept. 23, 2002), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8fff-
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(last updated May 16, 2012), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0-ae912-8fff-





217. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULES & PROCEDURES, RULE 304 - USE OF NON-LETHAL FORCE (Apr. 29, 
2013), available at http://static.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/52af5f43e4b0dbce9d2 
2a824/1387224899721/Rule%20304.pdf [hereinafter BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 304CUSE OF NON-LETHAL 
FORCE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining non-lethal force as “that amount of force that will 
generally not result in serious bodily injury or death”).  
218. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULES & PROCEDURES, RULE 303A - USE OF LESS-LETHAL FORCE (June 22, 
2000), available at http://static.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/52af5f3ae4b0dbce9d22a 
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FORCE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Less-Lethal Force Philosophy is a concept of planning and 
force application that meets operational objectives, with less potential for causing death or serious physical 
injury than the use of deadly force.”). 
219. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULES & PROCEDURES, RULE 303 - USE OF DEADLY FORCE (Apr. 11, 2003), 
available at http://static.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/52af5f30e4b0dbce9d22a80d/ 
1387224880253/Rule%20303.pdf [hereinafter BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 303C USE OF DEADLY FORCE] (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining deadly force as “that degree of force likely to result in death or great 
bodily injury”).  
220. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 304 - USE OF NON-LETHAL FORCE, supra note 217, 
(“The ‘Reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from [the] perspective of 
[a] reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that 
police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force 
necessary in a particular situation.”). 
221. Id. 
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use non-lethal force when encountering “passive resistance,” but the force must 
be reasonable “based on the totality of the circumstances.”222 The less-lethal 
policy is specifically tailored for the use of a twelve gauge “less lethal shotgun” 
and “flexible projectile rounds.”223 This policy is used for “the de-escalation of 
potentially violent situations.”224 The deadly force policy outlines when an officer 
may discharge his or her firearm.225 
2. Federal LEA Use of Force Policies 
According to its website, the FBI requires “a reasonable belief that the 
subject of [deadly] force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical 
injury to the agent or another person.”226 The FBI also encourages agents to give a 
verbal warning to comply before using deadly force.227 
The CBP recently completed a review of its current UOF policy and made 
changes based on several recommendations from its UOF Policy Division, the 
Police Executive Research Forum, and the DHS Office of the Inspector 
General.228 The CBP’s new UOF handbook includes the objective reasonableness 
standards outlined in Graham and Garner.229 The CBP has the same deadly force 
standard as the FBI.230 
Whether stated explicitly or implicitly, all of the UOF policies or practices 
appear to use the Graham standard to determine the proper use of force for any 
given situation.231 
B. A Model Armed Drone Use of Force Policy 
Using the Graham standard as well as some of the internal rules used in 
current UOF policies, the following model policy incorporates specific rules 
based on the use of armed drones: 
 
222. Id. 
223. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 303A - USE OF LESS-LETHAL FORCE, supra note 218. 
224. Id. 
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226. Frequently Asked Questions, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/faqs (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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228. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION USE OF FORCE REVIEWS, RECOMMENDATIONS, & NEXT 
STEPS, Border Security, CBP, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/bs/force_reviews.xml 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
229. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, USE OF FORCE POLICY, GUIDELINES & PROCEDURES 
HANDBOOK 1–2 (May 2014), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/UseofForcePolicy 
Handbook.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
230. Id. at 3. 
231. See supra Part VI.A. 
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I. Armed Drone Use of Force Policy 
A. A LEA will follow all applicable FAA regulations as well as state 
and federal laws regarding the operation of drones. 
B. When practical, an officer will notify the LEA supervisor that an 
armed drone has been deployed at a specific incident. 
C. Unless clearly contrary to an objective measure of reasonableness, 
the LEA supervisor shall approve every request by an officer at the 
scene to use the non-lethal or lethal drone weapons against a suspect 
or suspects. 
D. An officer who wishes to utilize a drone armed with non-lethal or 
lethal weapons as a use of force will make the decision under an 
objective reasonableness standard.232 Non-inclusive circumstances 
considered in the reasonableness standard include: (1) “the severity 
of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the subject poses an immediate 
threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and (3) “whether [the 
subject] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight.”233 
E. At no time will an officer controlling a drone act alone and use the 
drone to apply force on an individual, unless the drone operator is at 
the scene of the incident or, if not at the scene, the drone operator has 
received clear communication from an officer at the scene directing 
the operator to use the drone to apply force. 
Because the FAA authorizes LEAs to use drones in their daily operations, the 
LEA risks losing its ability to operate drones if it fails to comply with applicable 
federal laws, regulations, or state laws.234 
While there is nothing in the Graham standard that asks whether an officer 
notified or sought approval from a supervisor, some current LEA UOF policies 
require or suggest that an officer obtain permission prior to using certain less-
lethal weapons.235 Because these same less-lethal weapons are now mounted on 
the drone, it is likely wise to apply the same approval standard to minimize 
 
232. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 
233. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (stating the factors used in many UOF policies).  
234. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69; Part III.B–C (noting the lack of federal regulation on 
armed drones and various state approaches to armed drones).  
235. See, e.g., L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF USE OF FORCE POLICY, supra note 209, at 40 (stating that chemical 
agents “may be authorized by the Watch Commander or, if applicable, the Incident Commander, or by a 
Sergeant). The policy also states that “[p]rior to the use of [a taser], whenever practical, Department personnel 
shall request a supervisor.” Id. at 42. The officer who applied the “Precision Intervention Technique” in Scott v. 
Harris also requested and received permission from his supervisor prior to applying the maneuver. 550 U.S. 
372, 375 (2007).  
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public outcry or excessive force claims. However, the policy provides flexibility 
by acknowledging that there will be times when an officer cannot practically 
obtain approval from a supervisor prior to using force via drone. 
Since the Graham standard applies, it is only logical to include the actual 
language of the case within the drone policy. This ensures officers know what 
test they must comply with when using reasonable force. Specifically, the policy 
defines the circumstances where an officer utilizing a drone will meet the “on the 
scene” judgment of reasonable force that the Graham court requires.236 
In some situations, an officer controlling an armed drone from a building two 
miles away may have a reasonable belief, judging by what the officer can see 
from the drone camera, that force is necessary despite the fact that no officer is 
on the scene.237 The question remains whether a court will expand the “on the 
scene” reasonableness definition in the UOF analysis to include specific 
instances where an officer can perceive just enough from the drone camera to 
qualify as “on the scene” under the existing standard.238 Until then, this policy 
will allow officers to use armed drones and still remain within the established 
UOF standard under Graham.239 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The FAA Act opened American skies to drones—it is only a matter of time 
before they become a common sight overhead.240 As more LEAs obtain drones 
for everyday police use and the federal and state budgets continue to shrink,241 
interest in arming these drones with non-lethal and lethal weapons will grow.242 It 
is probably constitutional for a LEA to use armed drones in daily operations,243 
but LEAs face an uphill climb to convince a skeptical public that using armed 
 
236. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
237. See supra Part V.D. One could also question how useful armed drones may have been during 
situations where it was simply not feasible to have an officer on the scene. See, e.g., Jim Crogan, For 22 Murder 
Victims, LA Riots Leave Legacy of Justice Eluded, FOXNEWS (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/ 
2012/04/29/for-22-murder-victims-la-riots-leave-legacy-justice-eluded/ (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (noting five days of riots and violence in Los Angeles requiring the National Guard to provide support 
to the police); Joseph B. Treaster, Life-or-Death Words of the Day in a Battered City: ‘I Had to Get Out’, NY 
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/31/national/nationalspecial/31orleans.html?ref 
=hurricanekatrina&_r=0 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting armed looting during Hurricane 
Katrina and how police were “‘almost completely involved in saving lives and not in guarding [New 
Orleans]’”).  
238. See supra Part V.D. 
239. See supra notes 140–41.  
240. See Kim, supra note 12, at 54 (“[T]he aviation industry expects that 30,000 [drones] may soon fill 
domestic skies conducting operations that were until now unthinkable or cost-prohibitive.”).  
241. See Chuang, supra note 9 (noting the need for cost-cutting measures in law enforcement agencies). 
242. See Sexton, supra note 3 (stating an opinion of a Texas LEA that “drones armed with an array of 
non-lethal force options—including impact rounds, chemical munition rounds, and tasers—could save lives”); 
Chuang, supra note 9 (stating LEAs are considering drones as a “cost-cutting way to replace helicopters, and 
use technology to fight crime and save lives”). 
243. See supra Part III. 
2014 / Armed Drones for Law Enforcement 
572 
drones is a good idea.244 As the Graham v. Connor standard states, whether an 
officer’s actions are “objectively reasonable”—and therefore not excessive—
“must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.”245 
Until the Supreme Court develops a different standard or modifies the “on the 
scene” standard to incorporate an officer’s perspective from a drone camera, 
LEAs will need to develop a drone UOF policy that will not only meet the 




244. See supra Part IV. 
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